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This reply brief is necessary to correct several matters in respondents' brief which could be quite misleading here.
It seems to us that the effort is to escape the fundamental issues involved, by ignoring basic principles, by
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raising irrelevant matters, and by some confusion of the
issues and evidence.
We will not take the space to recite all instances
of these, nor will we pursue them in the order in which
they occur in respondents' brief, but we will refer to
and comment upon some more important examples, and
will do so in connection with one of the three subjects
to which they seem to relate.
In this brief, we will cite the record by the use of
the letter "R", and the transcript by the use of "T".
We will cite our first brief by use of the abbreviation
"A. bf.", and respondents' brief by use of "R. bf.". We
will use "we" for brevity, as referring to the defendant
Canal Companies and the Kennecott Corporation.
The parties hereto, on the Index pages of their two
respective briefs, have set up the three points relied
upon on both sides. Both relate to the same three general
subjects. Since these can be thus easily compared, repitition here is not necessary. If any of appellants' stated
points there is correct, they are entitled to a reversal
This does not appear to be questioned.
Appellants' first point is a legal one, and respondents have not met this by argument or authority. They
did so by restating a somewhat similar proposition,
changing ours so as to eliminate vital elements which
are present in this case.
The second point is a factual one, and is squarely
met by a contradiction of the conclusion derived from the
facts.
The third point involved mixed matters of fact and
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law, and is 1net by another statmnent on the sa1ne subject, with some added assun1ptions.
We will follow these three subjects in the order
pursued in the briefs.
POINT I.
The Authorities Support Appellants' Position:
By reference to the Index pages of the two briefs,
it will be at once noted that our staten1ent contains the
important ele1nent that lower rights here are dependent
upon the run-off flow and seepage from the direct application to which the waters involved have been applied.
Appellants omit this iinportant matter. The proposition
that they argue is stated as follows:

"The respondents Inay, by a change of the
nature of use application, acquire the right to
temporarily store water, the direct flow of which
has heretofore been appropriated by them, and
thereafter release such water for irrigation within the same area, when such change can be made
without impairing any vested or existing rights,
and will serve to prevent waste and permit a more
beneficial use of the water, particularly in view
of the fact that the appellants are in no position
to complain because frequently they do not utilize
the rights which they claim might be impaired,
and must release water which they impound into
Great Salt Lake."
Of course, it is easier .to try to support an ambiguous
statement of this kind than to try to meet the relevant
point, as stated by us (A. bf. 22). The main difficulty
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with this statement by respondents is that it is not a
statement of what we have to consider here, and the
determination of it is not decisive of this case. It is
also impossible to tell whether it is contended that respondents may do what they propose by reason of the
last clause alone, or by virtue of any other of the qualifying clauses, or by reason of the purported statement of
law contained in the first clause.
As we have pointed out before, this statement, and
the statements of respondents generally, proceed on the
theory that nobody else is interested in this water, or
has any right to be. Yet, the fact that appellants' rights
depend upon the run-off flow from the direct applicati~n
of the high water is the decisive element under the
authorities cited (A. bf. 30-37).
If there is one thing on which we must agree, it is
that the waters of American Fork Creek flow naturally
to Utah Lake. This is recited in respondents' application.
Respondents' right is to use some of this flow, as it
passes :the area, for direct irrigation only. This is a
separate and distinct right from a right to store. The
application to change is one to withhold such otherwise
passing waters from the high water flows, and release
and apply the waters withheld later on the same lands.
This is the application here. And, as a change proposition, it can be allowed only if it can and will be administered so as to insure that the now dependent rights will
be fully protected.
We have cited (A. bf. 31-37) the cases that have
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passed upon such atte1npts, and, in each one, the right
to so withhold has been denied.
If respondents 1uay, as they recite, "acquire the right
to tmnporarily store" by this application, they certainly
do not. have a right to acquire such right. In other words,
they do not, as they repeatedly urge throughout their
brief, have a "yested right" to a change of nature of use,
as sought.
We cited (A. bf. 39) the language used in Moyle v.
Salt Lake City, that the right to change "is not an absolute or vested right," and involves the "element of judgment" on the part of the State Engineer.
vVe cited, also, (A. bf. 65) U. S. v. Caldwell, wherein
this Court said:
"A cmnplete answer to the contention, however, is that appellants' right to change the place
of diversion is not an absolute or vested right, but
is only a conditional or qualified one. No such
change can be made, if thereby the public, or any
other appropriator, prior or subsequent, is adversely affected."
As is also pointed out in the J.l/ oyle case, above,
there is a distinction made in the statute (100-3-3) as to
this kind of application for "pennanent" change. As to
applications for "temporary" change, it is recited that
the "State Engineer shall make an investigation, and if
such temporary change does not impair any vested
rights of others, he shall make an order authorizing the
rhange."
But, as pointed out, there is no such language in
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dealing with pennanent change, and here we have application for a permanent change. So that, while this
proposed change may or will "adversely" affect our
rights, respondents do not have a "vested right" to it,
even if it may not. The Engineer may, and here does,
have problerns of administration, independent of those of
the litigating protestants.
The statute says:
"No permanent change shall be made except
on the approval of the application therefor by the
State Engineer."
In all of the provisions of our water code, dealing
with the Engineer's duties, and his authority, and with
the many kinds of applications provided for his approval,
~this is the only instance in which it is expressly stated
that the thing sought cannot be had "except" on "the
approval" of the State Engineer.
This is important, and it probably is because this,
as well as the problems of distribution which are afterward involved in all such changes, calls for the application of special judgment, training, and experience.
It would seem certain that, when a task is so completely committed to a particular administrative office,
his determination could not be properly over-ruled by
the courts, on a mere difference of opinion (A. bf. 77,
86), or for anything short of capricious conduct, amounting to an abuse of discretion. There is nothing like
this alleged or claimed here.
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But more directly on Point I, it is noted that respondents do cite one ca8e supporting their statement,
but none refuting ours.
They cite Seuen Lakes ResetToir (Colo.) (R. bf. 36),
as if this were a discovery of theirs, omitting to mention
that we had cited it (A. bf. 30) for the purpose of distinguishing it, by pointing out that, in that case, there
were no rights dependent upon run-off from the former
use of water involved. The opinion recites that no other
rights could be affected.
The reservoir company had purchased new rights,
and took them into the Big Thornpson River. This river
is one of the large streams tributary to the Platte River.
They sought to then turn out and store the water. The
opinion restricts the decision to these "priorities" purchased" for such storage (93 P. at 486).
On rehearing, it is further pointed out that, in that
c~se, "there cannot possibly be any greater burden imposed upon the con1mon source of -supply of the respective ditches owned or controlled by the parties * * * ."
Also, it is pointed out (93 P. at 497) that this decision is not contrary to Colo. M & E.- Co. v. Lorimer, 56 P.
185. This latter case is one of the cases cited by us (A.
bf. 31, 43), and it holds that, where lower rights are dependent upon the run-off from the right of use by the
prior appropriator, such appropriator cannot withhold
and store a portion of the water which he is entitled to
use directly. As the opinion says:
"Otherwise expressed, * * * although the irrigation company could change the use of its apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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propriation from irrigation to that of storage, it
could not divert water for that purpose, which
would result in a diversion measured by either
volume or time to the damage of plaintiff."
Thus, in one of these two cases it was held that the
change could be 1nade, and, in the other, it was held that
it could not be made. And the difference is that, in this
latter mentioned case, the lower users used the water,
and their right of use might be affected as to volume or
time by its being stored. That is the situation here, and
there is no value in quoting from a case in which that
point could not be involved, at all.
We also cited other cases (A. bf. 33) involving storage of direct flow wa:ters, including the Finley case (A.
bf. 34), which is in point on the withholding of such
water, where there are lower dependent rights.
Other cases follow, discussing the principle, including the Williams case (Or.) (A. bf. 36), which is again
in point on the question of diverting by an upper user,
when lower rights depend on the run-off from the former
use.
Respondents have conveniently ignored all these
cases.
And, incidentally, it is important to mention, at this
point, that, throughout respondents' brief, they refer to
this proposal of theirs as something that is "common in
irrigation practice;" or that occurred in "numerous" or
"frequent" instances, and is "similar to that utilized on
countless other streams" (R. bf. 8). This is just not so.
In introducing the cases above referred to in our
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brief {~\. bf. 30), we called attention to an article by an
author, ~Ir. J. E. Ethell, in which he stated that, U:(> to
that time (1910), on the question as to whether an
"owner of a prior right to water for direct application
(is) privileged to store water for future use," he had
found only two cases. And this plan is not only extremely
rare, but, in this State, was completely new, with this
case.
Note, also, that the question that Mr. Ethell is discussing is whether such owner is privileged to withhold
from his own right, and store, without reference to the
other point as to dependent lower rights. Neither side
has found a single case where an application for such change has been made before to a public board or official.
On the point of run-off, which we are now discussing,
we made a thorough search, and found only the articles
and cases cited. Respondents have cited none additional,
except that they do refer (R. bf. 37) to another Colorado
case, Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co. et al. v. Farmers
Pawnee Ditch Co., 146 P. 247, and to the Gunnison Irr.
Co. v. Gunnison Highland Canal Co., 52 Utah 347, 147
P. 852.
This Utah case is not in point, and there does not
seem to be much claim that it is. It does state, however,
as quoted, "that a diS'tinction may be drawn between a
direct irrigation for immediate use on the one hand and
storage for future use on the other." See, also, on that
Rocky Ford v. Kents (Utah), 141 P. (2) 629, par. 1.
The Colorado case (146 P. 247), however, does decide
a point which is directly contrary to the respondents'
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position on Point I. Respondents (R. bf. 37) stated that
"the sarne principle is enunciated in this case as is decided in the 8 even Lakes Reservoir case above referred
to." The fact is, that the point decided in that case is not
involved in this Greeley and Loveland case, but the
latter case is pertinent to our case here.
In this case ( 14 7 P. 24 7), the Greeley and Loveland
Cor_npany operated an irrigation 3ystem on the Big
Thornpson River, 175 miles above the irrigation district
of the plaintiff Pawnee Ditch Company. A storm occurred at the upper district, producing a substantial
amount of water. The defendant irrigation company had
a right to and could beneficially use the water, but their
gates were not set for it, and they could make better use
of it later in the season by then storing it, which they
had the facilities to do, and which they did.
The ditch company brought the suit, to require them
to release the water down the stream, and to restrain
them from again storing water which they were entitled
to use for direct irrigation.
The opinion, which is also by Judge Gabbert of the
Colorado Supreme Court, denied the right of the irrigation company to store the water, and ordered judgment
in accordance with the prayer. This was against the same
contentions tha,t are made here, that they were only taking it at a time when they had a right to use it, and in
quantities which they then had a right to use, and ~tore
lease for use on their same lands, all of which, it seems,
was not disputed.
In this Colorado case, there was also the additional
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
defense contention that the lower ditch company had
not proved that, if the water had not been held, it would
have been available for use by plaintiffs. This, again, is
a contention which is repeatedly made in respondents'
brief~ that we are required to show such unavailability
and damage at all ti1nes. This, of course, is entirely erroneous. ~-\11 that need appear is that the effect of granting this application would be such that i,t could not be
insured that our rights would not be "adversely affected."
On this point, Judge Gabbert ( 146 P. at 249) said:
"On behalf of the defendant cornpany, it is
contended that the cornplaint fails to state a cause
of action, because it is not alleged that, had the
flood water not been intercepted by storage, it
would have reached the headgate of the plaintiff.
It is also (•laimed the testimony fails to establish
that, had this water not been diverted, it would
have been available for the use of plaintiff; and
hence the judgn1ent is contrary to the law and
the evidence. These propositions can be considered together. The water involved did not belong in specie to the plaintiff; but when it appears,
as it does, from the allegations of the complaint
and proof, that it has a decreed priority to the
use of water from the stream, the flow of which
would presumably be augmented by the flood
water diverted, and at the time of such diversion
was in need of water to supply its priorities. i't
will be presumed that the volume in the stremn
was depleted to its injury as the result of the
wrongful diversion by the defendant company.
So that, instead of plaintiff being required to allege and prove such facts, it was incumbent upon
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the defendant company to allege and prove them
in order to excuse its wrongful act."
Like the Colo. M. & E. v. Lorimer case (56 P. 185),
and our case here, this then again is storage "which
would result in a diversion 1neasured by either volume or
time."

Preventing Waste is Not Involved:
In stating their first point, to the effect that respondents may acquire, by change application, the right
to store water, a limitation which they impose on the
generality of this statement is that they may so acquire
"when such change * * * will serve to prevent waste."
Respondents talk a great deal about preventing
"waste," but do not ·seem to tie it into anything that affects the rights of anybody here. And, so far as we can
see, there are no rights which depend on this, at all.
This reference could be to any of three matters mentioned by them:
1. The first is that this application might have
some affect on possible early waste by them.
2. The second is that it has some connection with
alleged waste by us.
3. And the third is a reference by them to the
laws applicable to waste waters.
1. The first of these can only be by way of some
kind of admission that, by turning out early all of the
water that they can get into their ditches, they might
commit some waste. And this involves, also, the suggestion that, if they hold back some of it, instead of putting
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it into their ditches, then thi8 waste would be prevented.
There i8, of eour8e, no 8ense or validity in such suggestion, because they never did aequire the right to waste
any water. .And, a8 the Engineer has said in his opinion,
they could expect to hold back only when they could
beneficially use.
And, it should be pointed out that, while their expert witness, ~Ir. Richards, has assumed that they had
a right to fill their ditches in the early season, when they
could (and so has respondents' counsel), the watermaster
has denied that they so use water, or that they could so
beneficially use it all, except "if it is a dry year" (T. 58).
He also testified, contrary to their assumptions, that
"run-off water, could vary according to storms, too." Also, and contrary to what respondents say in their brief
(R. bf. 6-7), the witness testified that "when we get the
ditches cleaned out, we can take care of quite a lot of
water * * * up to about between 300 or 350 second feet
* * * I do not think we can take care of any more than
that" (T. 43).
We think it is perfectly fair to say that 300 second
feet is about the capacity of the ditches of the "three
companies" there referred to by this witness. They seem
to agree that some of this early use of high water has not
been highly beneficial.
It is important to note that, by the decree (R. 113),
Lehi is entitled to only one-sixth of the water of Ainerican Fork Creek up to July 1st of each year. So that there
would have to be 600 cfs. before they would be entitled
to 100 cfs. Also, that American Fork is entitled to only
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80 cfs., and that then the secondary users take over in
that area (T. 71-72; Searle).
H~ also said ( T. 49), "some years you water early
and some you don't. It's according to the season."
And, the following occurs (T. 50).:

"Q.

Well, in April it would be pretty wet from the
snow and rain, would it not~
"A. VVell, you wouldn't water if it was snowing
and raining."

This is the only witness of respondents who testified
as to these facts, and his testimony is contrary to what
is assumed in their briefs and arguments.
The witness went on to testify (T. 50) that, if the
water went through the ditches, and was not used on the
land, it would go to the "mill-pond, sloughs, and lake;"
and (T. 52) that there would not be as much water go
down there in August as there would in April; and that,
in a dry month, in a dry year, "there wouldn't be any get
down" to the Lake (T. 52).
Respondents cannot get authority to store any water
they might otherwise waste.
2. The second reference is to our alleged "waste"
of water from the Lake. Not only is respondents' right
unaffected by any claim of this kind, but, as we think we
have demonstrated (A. bf. 24-27), the claim is utterly
untenable. Because, in three years since 1924 (T. 300),
water has been released into the Jordan River from
Utah Lake, and then not in the season in which respondents propose storing the water (T. 147-149). They exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pect to get a pennanent right to store every year.
Since we have cited the fact::; and the record, there
is no excuse for the irresponsible and reckless statement::;
made by respondent::; with relation to this matter. They
have not proved that any water that is so turned frorn the
Lake is wasted, at all. They put on .Mr. Gardner, the
Utah Lake Con1nlissioner, as their witness on this, and he
testified that he understood there were rights on the
Jordan River, clear down stream into Davis County, and
he did not know that any water turned out was wasted
(T. 151-154); and no one else testified that any was.
Not only are the facts ignored, but also the holdings in the Colledge case, in which case the agreement
there approved set up a Lake Com1nission to control
the .water, and respondents persist in saying that the
appellants turn out and waste the water, when we have
no more to do with it than the respondents do.
They also ignore the fact, pointed out in our brief
(A. bf. 26), that there is an approved application (No.
12114) by the Federal Bureau of Recla1nation to withhold from the Lake 30,000 acre feet at any time that the
State Engineer can anticipate that unappropriated water
will be spilled from the Lake. It would be only at such
time, and only after existing rights are supplied, that
respondents could gain any right to withhold such water,
even if they had filed an application so to do.
3. The next matter of waste to which they may
refer in their statement of Point I is their reference to
the law of waste water (R. 35-36). This entirely new
thought, however, needs little discussion.
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We are here dealing with the right to change an
established direct use in one irrigation district and systmn, when rights to the run-off from the use have been
acquired for use in a lower and separate irrigation district and system; and it has absolutely nothing to do with
the law of reclaiming waste water, as discussed in the
authorities cited, or in the Utah cases mentioned, by
respondents (R. bf. 36).
And, this whole discussion by respondents, as we say
again, has nothing to do with their acquirement or denial
of the privilege of the change actually sought by the
application here.
"More" Or "Highest Beneficial Use" is Not Involved:
The next qualification that respondents place upon
their general statement of Point I is that they may acquire a right "when such change * * * will * * * permit
a more beneficial use of the water."
We do not think that a more or higher beneficial
use is determinative of the rights of the parties here, at
all. If water is required for any beneficial use, it may
be so used. And, except under statutory provisions dealing with water for domestic, as opposed to industrial
or some other less necessary use, we have never known
of any discrimination between beneficial uses by users,
because of more valuable crops, or any other similar
reason.
Respondents, on this, show a very clear conviction
that use by them is the "highest" and also the "most
beneficial" use, and that any water that goes past them
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and i~ used in Salt Lake County is either totally
.. wasted, .. or is put to a less beneficial use.
They were all stea1ned up about this before the
Trial Court, and still are; and yet, so far as their right
is· concerned, or, for that n1atter, the rights of irrigators
in Salt Lake County are concerned, it makes no difference
whether the water is used late or early on cheap crops,
or late or early on valuable ones. This was a subject
for good propaganda talk below; but it is of no actual
help here.
\Ve point out, also, that there is not a word of evidence in this record, or any proof of any kind, that anyone will or can raise any different crops, if this application is gran ted.
There is talk in the pleadings to the effect that they
can use water later on sugar beets, or "more valuable
crops." It is common knowledge, of course, that they
raised sugar beets here for many, many years, and
supplied the sugar beet factory which stood at Mulliner's
Pond near Lehi; also, that that factory has been torn
down and removed a number of years ago.
But, there is no proof by any water user, or at all,
that they will put the water on any crop different from
those on which it has been and is being used, or on which
it is now being used in Salt Lake County.
Appellants Injured by the uEffect" of the Proposed Plan:
The last limitation on the general statement of
respondents' Point I is that they may acquire the right
to store the water involved, "because frequently" we
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are not able to utilize our right. This is not true; in fact,
we always use all available water (T. 232, line 11).
However, on this, it is argued (R. bf. 33) that we are
not in position to object "to proposed change ** * at
le.ast during the time such wastage is being carried on,
or when such wastage affects the supply in Utah Lake
during any hold-back in the high-water season."
This remarkable statement is that if, at any time,
water is being turned out of Utah Lake, and so wasted,
then, and at that time, respondents can hold back such
amount of water in this proposed reservoir. Therefore,
the application should be approved.
This shows how completely the judgment, obtained
in the Lower Court, depends upon the contention and
the finding of the Court of alleged waste of water from
Utah Lake. This is something that the State Engineer
and the other defendants never suspected could be involved in this application, at all, and, certainly, appellants do not think that it is.
(So, parenthetically, and mainly for Point III ante,
here is another impossible administrative problem for
the State Engineer, as he would have to determine, each
time that water is being released from the Lake to Jordan
River, as to how much of such water is being lawfully
used by appropriators between that point and Great Salt
Lake. And, if he thus determines that some of this is
being wasted, he must go up to respondents' reservoir
and hold back an equal amount. It is not indicated why
he would not have to hold back for the Bureau of Reclamation at Deer Creek, instead.)
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'Ve have discussed the point involved (A. bf. :2-l-),
and won't go over it again . .And, it is clear that no waste
is proved here, even in those three years occurring since
19:2-!, in which son1e water was released, before the appellant canal con1panies started irrigation (T. 152-154,
300, 307-308). Also, that any water which may be expected to spill, if not required below, is appropriated, up
to 30,000 acre feet, by the Bureau of Reclamation (A. bf.
26) .
.All that this application seeks is to change respondents' direct use of water back up to a reservoir, before
such water reaches the Lake. It has no relation to rights
in water that 111ight be released from the Lake (A. bf.
:25-:26).
It appears, without dispute, that irrigation fron1
the Lake starts the first part of May usually, and practically always somewhere between April 19th and May
lOth (T. 156, line 19). Also, that the withholding, which
by the application could begin April 15th, ordinarily
could not start until about June, when the snow would
be melting up on top there. This, then, if withheld, would
directly affect the rights of the appellant users, as well
as other rights, on the Lake.
And, this above quoted portion of respondents' Point
I see1ns to us to show two additional intportant misconceptions in this case :
a. The conception that they are dealing with simply
one turn of water, or water that might become available
for a few days-say every five or ten years, under some
special circumstances-when, in fact, in this case we are
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dealing with an application for the privilege of constructing a permanent dam with a permanent right to withhold
and store out of high water in every year, regardless
of the conditions recited.
b. Also, the conception that we are contending that
there may not, at some time, be a moment or a day or a
week when they could withhold water without injury to
what we might be doing at that time. We are objecting
to "the effect" of a permanent plan, which cannot be
operated without injury to our rights, as the Engineer
has found.
The thing that we are claiming is our acquired right
in the use of the run-off from respondents' direct irrigation use. This run-off supplies our right. It supplies
no right of respondents. It is not a question of temporary inconvenience. It is a matter of change of conditions, which change will permanently jeopardize all
rights on this source in this County.
The cases, such as the Gunnison case, cited by respondents (R. bf. 38), predicate the privilege of change
upon the, premises that it "does not injuriously affect
the rights of others."
The language of the statute, 100-3-3, is that "no such
change shall be made if it impairs any vesteQ. right."
This is the plan the State Engineer had to pass upon. He had to determine whether the plan could be set
up, and administered, so as to insure that appellants'
rights would be fully protected. It cannot be, and will not
be. But, to respondents, that makes it not at all "unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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feasible.'' The nwre water the plan keeps awny from n::-;,
the Inore "practieable and fea::;ible'' it is.
This position of respondents (R. bf. 33) also diseloses son1e very i1nportant ad1nissions here.
The whole contention that they have the right to
withhold and store, when W'ater would othenvise be spilling frmn the Lake. ad1nits that the water would reach
the Lake prmnptly. if not so withheld. And this is true,
as 'Ne have shown (A. bf. 40-45). It is so plain, in fact,
that it is not surprising that respondents unconsciously
concede it.
They make the san1e ad1nission, when they argue that
their plan might save some water loss from evaporation,
because the 1,000 acre feet of water, if not held back,
would expand the surface area of the Lake by about 35
acres. They clai1n that this would be about the size of
their basin reservoir, as proposed, but contend that it
is colder up there, so that the evaporation would be less.
All of the testin1ony on this, and the argument, relates to the increased surface at the tin1e of the proposed
withholding, and, therefore, of course, admits that the
water would be in the Lake, except for the withholding.
There is an additional contention, which is related
to the foregoing discussion, and which should, therefore,
probably be rnentioned before we leave Point I. This is
the contention mentioned (R. bf. 25), and reiterated elsewhere, to the effect that, if anybody were injured by the
water not going into the Lake, as it now does, this would
be "inferior" or "secondary" rights, and not the rights of
these protestants and defendants. We have cited the
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Lake Commissioner's testimony that the water never
supplies all the Lake rights and, above, that we need all
the water we can get into the Lake.·
And we cannot find in the record any proof of any
rights that are inferior to the rights of these defendant
parties, although we do mention in our brief the Bureau
of Reclamation's approved application for the privilege
of holding back waters from the Lake.
It is sufficient to say that the defendant canal companies' rights are, in fact, secondary to the "primary
rights" on Utah Lake, and are not the "primary rights,"
as respondents seem to assume. The Morse Decree (Ex.
"13") shows this, and it also requires the five Associated Canal Companies to see to it, by pumping water
or otherwise, that the actual primary rights in the Lake
are supplied. This is a condition imposed upon our right
to withdraw water from the Lake. It also recites these
primary rights, and shows that many of these are down
the river, northerly from any diversions by these canal
companies. We pump water every year to supply them.
Of course, the Kennecott rights are rights that were
acquired on applications filed subsequent to this Decree; and, as shown by their chief engineer (T. 368-369),
their rights are seldom supplied, and it is vital to their
rights that this water get into the Lake during the early
season. And, it is also plain that, whatever portion may
get into it in the Fall, would generally be of no benefit
at all.
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POINT II.
The respondents say, as to this point: "The record
discloses that the proposed plan for diversion and storage would not interfere with the rights of the lower
users, either as to volun1e, time of use, or otherwise."
Leaving the question of volu1ne for a rnoment, it
seems re1narkable that anyone would say that you could
hold back, for two to six months, high water which, in
natural course of drainage and use must prmnptly go to
the Lake, when the ground is saturated from early melting of snows and frorn rains, and that this would not
interfere with the appellant users below, as to time.
It is undisputed that we have to .;;tart pumping from
the Lake in :May, or before, in each year, to get water
for irrigation; and we start irrigating in S.alt Lake
County between April19 and May 10 each year.
And this is claimed, even though the water may be
released frmn this proposed reservoir as late as October;
and, in any event, in the later irrigation season; and will,
by the very purpose of the undertaking, be released in
the later, hotter, and drier months. The time that it
could reach the Lake would, necessarily, be later, and
its further delay, by greater re-uses, clear down through
the swamp areas to the Lake, must, also, result in
greater loss by evaporation and transpiration.
We believe we have sufficiently established this, and
have also demonstrated that it is a matter of common
knowledge that, not only must such delay in time occur,
but a very substantial loss would occur (See A. bf. 38Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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45). The opinion in the Pawnee Ditch Co. case, supra,
says: "it will be presumed."
Respondents do not cite any record to support their
statement. They claim that their expert witness stated
the conclusions that the plan could be operated so that
lower users would "not be substantially damaged." The
State Engineer, who is charged with adopting administrative policies which will prevent interference, says
that it cannot be done.
Respondents talk about findings of fact by the Court,
as to such interference. The Court makes no finding
of fact on this, and no findings of fact on any controverted issue here, at all. The Court states only conclusions to the effect that the "approval of the application
would not infringe on vested rights," and states, as a reason, that water spills to Great Salt Lake in some years
(R. 116).
In Sigurd City v. State, et al, 152 P. (2) 154, at 156,
this Court says something that is exactly applicable
here:
"'-,
"But the court in its findings of fact as well
as in its conclusions of law and decree concluded
* * * that the defendants were the owners of all
of the waters taken by plaintiff into its pipelines
at Rosses Creek. Such conclusions, even though
stated as findings of fact, are really conclusions
. of law, and to the extent that they are in conflict
with the views herein expressed are not supported
·by the facts and are therefore set aside."
We call attention now to a few matters stated by
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respondent~

in connection with this point, in which they
appear to be entirely mistaken.
Respondents' witness, ~Ir. Richards, testified only
that the taking of this water into the proposed reservoir
would not affect availability of water in Utah Lake "to
any substantial degree," and indicated that he based
this 1nainl~· on the fact that this particular proposal is to
hold back 1,000 acre feet, which he thought, all told, was
not a "substantial" mnount. That, however, is wholly
i1mnaterial in this case. It is rights, not quantities, that
are controlling here. And, as we have demonstrated
(A. bf. -!0--!1), if these respondents can so hold back that
ainount, they can hold back any other amount, or the
total flow of American Fork Creek; and so can any other
upper user, on any other tributary to the Lake, or to any
supply in the State.
Respondents' witness also proceeded upon the theory
that water, reaching the Lake in October, would be "as._.
available" as water reaching it in the earlier irrigation
season. This is totally wrong, as to time and as to quantity, too, as to anyone except the "primary" users on the
Lake. And, the undisputed fact is that, because the Lake
is always drained down to the bottom, water reaching the
outer borders of the Lake late would not reach the body
of water from where it could be pumped; at least, a great
deal of it never could.
Respondents next attack (R. bf. 41) our witness, :Jir.
Earl, and also Mr. Gardner, notwithstanding the fact
that Mr. Gardner is a Commissioner on the Lake, appointed by the State Engineer, and that respondents
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called him first as their own witness (T. 146). The fact is
that the testimony of both of these witnesses is entirely
intelligent, consistent, and correct. The trouble is that
respondents either do not understand it, or they want to
misconstrue it.
This is done largely by taking the testin1ony of these
Engineers, with relation to percolating underground
waters, and discussing it as if they were testifying as to
surface run-off, and thus claiming a contradiction. There
are no contradictions.
As to the waters that enter to depth, it is true that
no witness did, and nobody can, tell exactly when this
would reach the Lake, or whether a good deal of it would
or would not reach the Lake at all, or how much the loss
would be.
Mr. Earl's testimony is that of an expert Engineer,
who carries great responsibility and has had a great deal
of experience in water matters, and who has carried on
experiments on the most effective methods of irrigation
( T. 332-338). His testimony is not only consistent, but
very intelligent and fair, when examined and understood.
It is not shown, as stated (R. bf. 43), that the heavy
run-off in the Spring would not reach the Lake until the
close of the irrigation season. Not only is it not shown,
but the contrary has been shown, and this is admitted, a~
we have shown above, by the respondents' own contentions. It is only about seven miles (T. 318), and downhill (See Ex. "15"), from the mouth of the Canyon to
the Lake.
In this connection, they discuss our reference to a
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nun1ber of applications filed in the 8tate Engineer's
Office since this one was filed, including· additional ones
on supplies to Utah Lake, and to our contention that we
are trying to settle a principle and policy applicable to
this kind of change application for the first time in this
State. And, on this, they again argue (R. bf. -13) that,
if this change were multiplied indefinitely, the amount
of usable water would not be substantially affected, because "loss of evaporation n1ight be reduced and waste
into Great Salt Lake might be minimized."
This is not correct, in fact. But thus, we are back
again to their admission that this water, if not held
back, would reach the Lake, and thus cause spilling to
the Jordan River, or more evaporation by expanding the
surface area of the Lake.
Conunencing at page 8 of our first brief, we set up
the U.S.G.S. 1neasurements taken 4.10 miles up the Creek
from respondents' diversion point. And then, taking all
of the readings available down at their point of diversion, attempt to arrive at a reasonable high water flow
down there for the 22 years in which the Government
took these upper measurements (Ex. "4").
The respondents (R. bf. 10) make some very inaccurate and unfair statements with reference to this
comparison. In the first place, nobody can rightly question the measurements by the U.S.G.S. (Ex. "4"), nor
can they question, as respondents do, the measurements made by the State Engineer's Office (Ex. "7")
from 1938 to 1940 (A. bf. 10).
By taking all the readings available at the point
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of diversion, including the State Engineer's readings,
and what we have referred to as the Gardner reading
(A. bf. 10), but which is also the same reading for 1938
taken by Mr. Warnock, one of respondents' watermasters
(Ex. "CC"), and also taking Mr. Searle's readings for
the years 1944 to 1948 (Ex. "L"), we had nine readings
in nine years, as indicated in our brief, for comparison
with the U.S.G.S. readings (Ex. "4") for nine out of the
twenty-two years, on the same dates.
This showed that 45% added to the U.S.G.S. high
water readings, equalled the readings at the point of
diversion in the month of May on an average. This is
the 1nonth in which it is plain that the high water maximums mostly occur. This seemed to us to be a fair and,
perhaps, the only appropriate comparison that could be
made in order to determine the approximate high water
flow at the point of diversion for the 13 years in which
we had no readings at the point of diversion. Respondents do not like it, because it proves that 1938 was not
an exceptionally high water year, as they have assumed
and have told the Court below and here.
Now they state (R. bf. 7) that the majority of the
readings on our page 8, which are the U.S.G.S. readings,
are below 300 cfs. Since we were only trying to determine how frequently 300 cfs., or more, is delivered at the
point of diversion, this is a 1nisleading statement. The
300 cfs. by U.S.G.S. would show, at least, more than
400 cfs. at respondents' diversion point.
We might add, however, that notwithstanding the
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tween the U.S.G.8. point of n1easure1nent and the point
of diversion, there are a considerable nu1nber of years in
which the U.S.G.S. reading is 300 cfs., or more, even up
where these were taken; in fact, in nine out of the twentytwo years.
Respondents then c01nplain (R. bf. 10-11) that the
U.S.G.S. Ineasureiuents are at variance with s01ne of .Mr.
Searle's readings. If they are, it is too bad for ~1 r.
Searle. However, his readings have been introduced
and, on the whole, they do not vary a great deal from
the pattern set by all the other readings. And our forInula is not "wholly at variance with them'' (R. bf. 10).
It is based on then1, as well as the other readings.
Counsel then say that they "could" pick out, and
they do pick out, an instance where there was more water
on the san1e day shown in the U.S.G.S. readings upstream, than is shown by Mr. Searle at the point of
diversion. Since it was testified that there were no
diversions of any consequence between these two points
(T. 54), this would appear to be impossible, if taken on
the same exact flow; and so respondents want this Court
to believe that the U.S.G.S. readings, taken by their Engineers who had no interest whatsoever in anyone connected with this suit, and of which we have exact photostats (Ex. "4"), are wrong; and this, even though they
are entirely consistent with all other readings, except a
few of Mr. Searle's.
As a matter of fact, his readings, which respondents
finally contend are the only correct ones, are the only
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ones shown to contain inaccuracies, upon their introduction (T. 38).
Respondents, for an example, erroneously say (R.
bf. 10) that on May 13, 1944, the U.S.G.S. readings were
301 cfs., and Mr. Searle's readings were 225 cfs. That
would not be too surprising for one day, if true, since
respondents themselves prove, from two witnesses (T.
284), that readings at the same point could vary a good
deal during the same day. This is due mainly to the fact
that it may be very cold in the morning and warm in the
afternoon up there.
But, the fact is that the U.S.G.S. reading (A. bf. 8
and Ex. "4"), on May 13, 1944, is not 301 cfs., but is 275
cfs.; and the fact is, also, that Mr. Searle shows two
readings (Ex. "L") on May 13, 1944, the first one marked
"A.M:." being 224 cfs., as stated by respondents, but the
"P.M." reading on that same date was 352 cfs. (Ex. "L",
p. 1).
And so, we have for comparison on the "13th" a
reading of 275 cfs. by the U.S.G.S. and a reading of 352
cfs. by Mr. Searle, which is a different and a consistent
picture.
There may be slight variations, but, taken over the
whole of the nine years, the result see1ns fairly accurate.
And, as testified by the Lake Commissioner, the pattern
is consistent (T. 191).
Respondents say that in every case in which a similar test is n1ade "a similar ... divergence will be found".
But, of course, their claimed "divergence" is wrong,
because they use the wrong figures, and this statement
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
is incorrect, also. But, it is true that there are a few
other days when ~lr. :Searle'~ figures, at the point of
diversion, are lower than the U.S.G.S. readings on the
san1e date. His Inay be Inorning readings. He does not
indicate as to this, except occasionally.There are no instances that we could find, in checking all of the ~Iay readings, where the Warnock readings or the Gardner readings, or the State Engineer's
readings, at the point of diversion, are lower than the
U.S.G.S. readings on the sau1e day. It could be possible,
however, that, if Mr. Searle took an early morning reading, and U.S.G.S. took one late in the afternoon, that
~Ir. Searle's reading could be less, and both could be
correct.
\Ve are satisfied that the comparisons that we
made (A. bf. 8-12) are reasonably fair and accurate.
It is not surprising that respondents are disturbed
because these figures show that, in the great majority
of the twenty-two years in which the Government took
its readings, the high water at their diversion point
reached a volume which, in the Spring, would thoroughly
saturate the area. And so that, if water were then held
back, it would be water which would promptly reach
the Lake, if not so held.
Nor can respondents brush aside the showing that
we have made that, from some inflow readings taken
in this area, the run-off in the high water year of 1938,
as compared with 1939 and 1940, which were low water
years, was very substantially greater in May and in
June (A. bf. 15), and that, in May of 1938, through
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American Fork Creek and Spring Creek alone, it was
more than six times as much as in 1939, and almost four
times as much as in 1940 (A. bf. 16, and Ex. "11").
As we have stated before, the exhibits and respondents' witness, Mr. Richards, testimony shows that 65%
of the whole flow of American Fork Creek goes down
in the months of May and June; most of this in May.
Before leaving Point II, we would like to emphasize a closely related conclusion to which this case has
narrowed here, and which seems to us to be very important.
The Trial Court mnphatically, and without any finding to guide the State Engineer, reversed him; and a
complete examination of the briefs and of the records
and findings here will clearly indicate, we think, that
it was upon the conclusion that this plan could be put
into effect and operated, and the rights of the appellants protected, because of two stated reasons, and
only two reasons, and on two theories only, to-wit:
(1) That the granting of this application "would
not injure or disturb vested rights" (R. 99, 114), because
of finding No. 25 (R. 116) "that for several years in the
immediate past during the period April 15 to June 15,
there have been spilled from Utah Lake * * * large quantities of water * * *".
The fact is that these spillings were earlier than
this (T. 146-149). And~ in any event, this finding is
wholly untenable as a support for this reversal on this
"permanent" change application, or
(2) In ordering this reversal, the Trial Court is
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necessarily :::;etting up its judg1nent squarely against the
judg1nent of the ~tate Engineer on the practical proposition conunitted hy the Legislature to his discretion that
this undertaking cannot be ad1ninistered so as to insure
that vested rights will not be injured.
Thi:;; Court has held that this eannot legally be
done (~-\.. bf. G9, 77), and the Idaho Supreme Court has
so indicated (A. bf. 85-86); and it was on this proposition that Judge Cardoza said:
"Courts do not sit in judg1nent upon questions of legislative policy or administrative discretion." (A. bf. 86)
POINT III.
This point, as will appear from the crux of the
the issues here,(i;<J is ef fQ.Q gr9atest i:MtiH~rttuu~e t9 t~~
~ie~iott hel§ as summed up in the last preced.,W~
paragraphs, is one of great importance iD 88t8f&i-'fi{State Engineer, as affecting the water policy of the
State, and the burdens and duties of his office.
We direct the Court's attention to our stated Point
III, as it appears on the index page of appellants' brief
here, and as it is restated (A. bf. 45) and supported
logically and at length (A. bf. 45-86).
It will be noticed that respondents (R. bf. 49-59)
have ignored the law involved in our statement and
the authorities cited in our brief in support of it. They
make a statement of their Point III which deals with
disputes of fact. (See index page and R. bf. 49).
In the first portion, they simply state that the "State
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

Engineer's assertion * *' * that it cannot be so administered as to avoid such injury is not supported by the
evidence."
And argue that this is so because the State Engineer
did not testify, and then make the amazing and incorrect
assertion that the position of the Engineer "has been
abandoned" by him.
The only other refutation that is attempted is a
reliance upon the assertion that the State Engineer's
position has been entirely "overcome by the findings and
judgment of the trial court * * * on the trial de novo."
Not a single authority is cited in refutation of our
position as supported by the constitutional and statutory
provisions and numerous authorities cited; nor is any
authority cited by them in support of any phase of their
Point III statement.
••
·r We will notice, briefly, the principal contentions of
respondents·-on this.
The staten1ent that the State Engineer's decision
was that the proposed plan "can not be so administered
as to insure that the rights of lower users will not be·
injuriously affected," is a correct statement. And this
statement is quite conclusive against respondents. Their
statement that it is not supported by the evidence, is
not correct, and the implication that we have the burden
of supporting it is wholly untenable.
Since the Legislature has charged the State Engineer with the duty of determining policies and practices
of administration as to this kind of change, there seems
no escape from the proposition that the burden jR on

-·.J
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respondent::; to prove that his judg~uent is not only not
supported, but is so arbitrary or capricious as to a1nount
to an abu::;e of the discretion expressly vested in him.
His judgment certainly carries every presumption of
correctness and validity.
And so, while it seems that there is no requirement
that appellants support the Engineer's decision, the evidence by the witnesses, and the entire picture, including
the 1neasurements, the surface contours, the water conditions at different seasons, and the natural inferences
frmn all these, support this decision.
But appellants, in this staten1ent and in their brief,
appear to make the claim that the decision is not supported by the evidence because the Engineer did not
testify. It is true that he did not testify on this matter
in the Court b~low, and neither did his Chief Deputy,
who was present there. However, when we offered the
decision of the State Engineer, which had already been
pleaded by the respondents, we, as is usual in the practice, indicated that the Deputy, who prepared the decision, was present for cross-examination, if respondents
desired to question him as to the statements contained
in the opinion (T. 324). And these statements of the
State Engineer of his reasons, given in support of hif;l
decision, were specifically offered and received as Ex.
"12" (T. 324). This is a clear statement of essential
facts, of the pertinent principals of irrigation law included, and the conclusion resulting from these.
State Engineer's Testimony:
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rell, whose initials appear on the State Engineer's decision (Ex. "12"), participated in preparing the decision
is correct, as we all know. And we all know that he
attended all hearings before the State Engineer, together
with Mr. Ed W. Clyde, who was then attorney for the
State Engineer, and that Mr. Clyde examined witnesses,
and they both engaged in the discussions, and later participated in preparing the Engineer's decisions.
And it was this Mr. Clyde who had then collected
and annotated all the Utah water cases in the two volunles completed in December 1, 1948, as the "Digest of
Utah Water Law." This work was done in connection
With Mr. Clyde's work in the State Engineer's Office.
Mr. Cottrell, a civil and hydraulic engineer, had been
Chief Deputy in the State Engineer's Office for fifteen
years (T. 170), and he and 1\Ir. Clyde were and are two
of the best qualified authorities on water law and administration in the State. vV e need make no further comment on respondents' repeated attempts to ridicule this
opinion. It is an intelligent and clear statement, and
every principle of law in it is sound and correct, and no
authority has been offered to prove otherwise.
The statements made by respondents almost at the
beginning and throughout their brief, to the effect that
the State Engineer introduced no testimony as to the
impracticability (R. bf. 2), and that his deter1nination
"that the application can not be so administered as to
avoid such injury ... has been abandoned" (R. bf. 24)
by him, are entirely incorrect, as respondents must know.
They apparently admit (R. bf. 59) that the State
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Engineer's decision was before the rrrial Court, and in
evidence. rrhey seenl to Ininilnize the fon·e and effect of
this by saying that this was "the very decision which it
wa:; the court's duty to make anew." However that 1nay
be, the decision is the state1nent of the Engineer's position, and is his state1nent of a number of conditions and
reasons for his decision. It is in evidence.
It seen1s foolish to suggest that we should have had
hun repeat what is in this docu1nent, or re-state it.
Kothing in it has been refuted. It cannot be destroyed
by son1e layman's contrary opinion, when the statute
makes the State Engineer's judgment controlling.
The State Engineer has not abandond his position.
On the contrary, he was represented at every stage of
the trial by his attorney and Chief Deputy. His attorney
signed the Inain brief that was filed by appellants, and
they have again participated in this brief. His answer
to respondents' complaint denies every material allegation.
The question for decision is of vital importance to
the State Engineer, both as a matter of expense and of
water administration policy, and the functions of his
office. Since the litigation and decision here, as this
Court can take notice, the State Engineer's Office has
received numerous similar applications which involve the
same questions, as to withholding out of direct flow
rights, where lower users' rights depend upon such direct
irrigation, and where the applications are to withhold
out of waters which the applicants have a right to then .
use for direct irrigation, and to then turn down later in
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the season for use on the same land. Several of these
applications have been denied, and other decisions are
pending. An additional 23 cases, involving the same
principal, are now on appeal from the decision of the
State Engineer.
Another of the greater mistakes in respondents'
brief is in the statements that the Trial Court has made
findings of fact as to the practicability of the operation
proposed. There is no such finding of fact. There is
merely a bland conclusion, which is wholly unsupported
by any findings, at all, or any suggestions as to any
method that the Engineer might pursue to overcome the
difficulties suggested by him, or recited by us (A. bf. 5256), or at all. We have only a conflict of opinion between the Court and the administrative officer charged
with the exercise of discretion as a matter of legislative
policy.
Respondents attempt to escape this situation by the
assertion that the statute provides for a trial de novo
and, therefore, intended that the Court should so substitute his judgment. They say that "we all understand"
the effect of a trial de novo on appeal from the City
Court (R. bf. 59), but they then absolutely ignore all
of the decisions and the authorities cited by us on the
subject of this kind of appeal, including the decisions of
this Court, and which made a clear distinction between
that kind of court appeal and appeals from an administrative officer or board, charged with the exercise of
judgment and discretion. These point out that the decision of such officers are to be treated as still in existSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ence, regardles~ of the appeal and trial de novo, and then
can be set aside only on legal grounds, or, in cases of
this character, for abuse of discretion. (See A. bf. 61-74,
78-86). This Court has 1nade it clear that the opinion
of the Court cannot be ~ubstituted for that of such adIninistrative officer.
And, in answering a si1nilar suggestion, as we have
pointed out before (A. bf. 70), with reference to this
statute on trial de naco, this Court (77 P. 2d, at 365)
said:
"But Section 100-3-8, supra, does not stand
alone."
The Court then cites other sections of the water statute,
dealing with the State Engineer's powers and duties,
and gives effect to these.
All we are asking is that the other sections, involving the administrative duties and discretion of the Engineer, be considered by the Court in the same manner
here. It is these sections which proclaim the State policy, which the Engineer has followed.
Nor is there any material evidence that the plan,
which the Engineer found could not be administered
so as to avoid injury, can be so administered. Respondents' one witness set up ( T. 387-391), in connection with
his Ex. "EE", what he referred to as an "illustrative
plan" for a different and theoretical operation. He said,
as to this function of administration and his testimony,
that "it can not be determined unless you make certain
assumptions" (T. 387, line 12).
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We have pointed out that his assumptions, both as
to time of storage and as to time of release, and other
matters, in this theoretical illustration are not in accordance with the application which the Engineer would have
to administer. To avoid releasing and storing in the
same period, as the application provides, he assumes to
store in April, when there can be no storage, for the
simple reason that the snow will not be melte~, or melting will barely be commencing in the storage basin. Then
he assu1nes release of all the water in July, and the
application contemplates, or requires, no such release.
Then he assumes use of it on a limited amount of acreage, so as to try to give some run-off, when the application provides for its use on all the 16,000 acres of land
on which the water has been previously used, and the
evidence was without conflict that a good deal of it is
used on lands not owned or controlled by these respondents. Of course, the water would have to go to those
having the right to it when it was withheld.
It is one thing to administer a simplified theory,.
when you have no responsibility for the outcome. It
is another thing to try to administer what is actually
proposed here, with full responsibility.
We, and the Engineer, have pointed out many causes
and complications that could not be escaped, and which
show why this plan cannot be administered, and respondents, as stated in the first part of this brief, have s~g
gested others. But nowhere is there any suggestion for
meeting any of these.
Respondents' answer to all of this is simply the
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op1n1on of their own paid expert that it is ''feasible,"
and a denial of one of our staten1ents which was to the
effect that they could not even 1neasure the inflow to
their proposed reservoir to know how 1nuch was being
held back, if they were there in the period proposed for
storage. On a leading question, counsel obtained an
answer fron1 his witness that: "There shouldn't be any
practical difficulty" (Tr. 391) in measuring this inflow.
This staten1ent that the water that cmnes into this
basin can be n1easured so as to know how much they are
holding back at any time between April 15 and June
15, is an utterly ridiculous statement. This proposed
reservoir, by all the evidence here, is in the nature of a
lake, or basin. It is described, in the application (Ex.
"B") as Silver Lake Collecting Basin. This also recites,
under "Explanatory," that this lake is already being
used as a sort of reservoir. It is also referred to as
Silver Lake Flat (T. 183) by one who has seen it, and
by others, as embracing 35 acres. (See T. 2, 3 and pictures).
The Engineer who testified that you could measure
the water that got into it had not seen it. Two witnesses
testified that they saw the flow of a stream below it
( T. 402). No witness teti:fied that he had ever seen any
of the inflows to it. One witness did indicate, and everybody knows, that it would be normally filled with snow
until the last snow disappeared at that high elevation,
and that the last substantial flow of water is from these
higher snows, and comes in late June or probably July
(A. bf. 9).
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In order, apparently, to reduce somewhat this difficulty, as well as other difficulties of administration, respondents (R. bf. 6) deny our statement that the elevation of this proposed reservoir is 9,000 to 9,500 feet.
Yet, that is exactly the language used by respondents'
counsel, in stating the stipulation to which we all agreed.
He said (T. 215-216):
"MR. CHRISTENSEN: We'll stipulate that,
subject to if we get definite inforrnation to the
contrary * * * that the elevation of the proposed
reservoir is in the neighborhood of 9,000 feet * * •
or 9,500 in that vicinity."
"MR. MULLINER: 9,000 to 9,500."
"MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes."
There was never any definite information to the
contrary, and this stipulation is as to the "proposed
reservoir" itself.
As to this plan being "feasible," it perhaps is from
the standpoint of the respondents, because they would
doubtless get more water. Their witness is plainly not
talking about its being practicable or feasible from our
standpoint; and, still, he does admit that there are several difficulties.
Respondents Admit That Plan is "Impossible of Application":
It is very in1portant to note that the respondents,
throughout the trial and throughout their brief here,
have actually refused to recognize that in the proposed
withholding for storage, the administrator could, in any
event, legally withhold only such water as they, at that
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exact ti1ue, would be entitled to use for direct irrigation.
They assert that this is the theory of their application,
which it is; but they refuse to recognize the "effect"
of atte1npting it, because this, at once, sets up one impossibility of administration.
'fhey object to the State Engineer'"s statmuent that
it would require him to do what they assert their application intends to be done. They quote (R. bf. 26), "as
the very basis of the decision of the State Engineer"
a part of his opinion, wherein he states :
.. A direct flow user can only use that portion
to which his right entitles him, subject to the
vagaries of weather, conditions of crop, etc. * * *
the approval of the application granting the right
to store the water represented by flow rights
would impose upon an administrator the obligation of determining, as mentioned hereinbefore,
when weather conditions on the ground would or
would not permit the use of water by diversion
in applying it to beneficial use and time when the
applicant would not or could not, by reason of
other conditions, use the water in whole or in
part by direct diversion. This determination from
day to day and from time to time would _impose
a practical impossibility upon an administrator

...... "

It seems amazing that anyone would ridicule or
challenge that accurate statement. It is perfectly basic
in the law of change of use in irrigation law. But,
respondents gp on to state that this "entire thesis" is
challenged as being "wholly unrealistic, impractical, and
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impossible of application" (R. bf. 26), because it "would
entangle an administrator in a hopeless web of confusion."
This is what we have been saying all the time. And
the plan does require just exactly what the Engineer
says it does. And, unconsciously, respondents have thus
come close enough to what is really involved, to recognize the difficulty involved.
The determination that respondents must have the
immediate and present right to the use of water, before
the same could be withheld, is certainly required on this
proposed application, no matter how "impractical and
impossible of application" this makes the plan.
Respondents would not dare say that they could
withhold water which they were not, at the time of withholding, entitled to use, and then attempt to sustain
their application.
They go on to say (R. bf. 27) that water rights are
not administered that way. That the Engineer does not
watch all water users in the use of their water, and
make them quit using it when there is a rain-storm, or
a snow-storn1, or something of that kind. And that, if
the Engineer applied such reasoning to other storage
systems, such as Deer Creek, it would prevent the use
of that, and other such reservoirs. This misses the
point. The Engineer is not applying this reasoning
to any such situations.
And, if respondents would open their minds, they
would know that this problen1 of administration is not
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involved in Deer Creek, or other sirnilar storage. 'l,heir
proble1n here is new and different.
As this high water now goes down, it does not matter n1uch to the appellants' rights whether respondents
put son1e of it out on their ground by direct irrigation
during a stor1n, or whether they do not then turn it out.
In either event, n10st of it would reach the Lake prmnptly. That is not the ad1ninistrative n1atter involved here,
now.
The Engineer has not been called upon to tell them
just when they can or cannot have this water for- direct
irrigation, and 1nay never be. But, when they propose
to him that he take and store water for their later use,
they impose upon him the determination that any such
water taken is water they would then be legally entitled
to use. This is what he correctly said; and also what
respondents say renders the plan "impossible."
Now, in Deer Creek, the water which is stored there
is made up of outside water rights, acquired on Weber
River high water, and water later from the Duchesne
River, and a filing on Utah Lake. This is brought into
or held back on the Provo River, and stored. If these
respondents had acquired a right from Weber, or Du..
chesne, and wanted to store it up American Fork Canyon, we would have nothing to say. It would then be
a case, such as they have cited from Colorado (R. bf.
36), and which we have reviewed, supra, in which new
water rights were brought into the Big Thompson River,
in Colorado.
But here, they say: We want to withhold only
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water which we are entitled to use at the time of the
withholding, but we don't want the Engineer to so determine and to so limit us.
And, the Engineer says: If I do not withhold only
such water as you are then entitled to use, you are
enlarging your right by a change application, which the
law does not permit. If you do intend that I hold back
only such water as you are then entitled to use, I must
make this detennination continuously, and so we encounter the problem as recited in my opinion.
And this, with the other things involved, creates a
situation that is impossible of administration. Clearly
it is not a situation similar to Deer Creek.
And respondents' statements that "there are no diffi.!
culties here which were not encountered in any program
of storage" (R. bf. 44), and that the difficulties are "less
than on numerous other irrigation systems" (R. bf. 51),
and that this is a "simple matter" and "one of ordinary
water administration" (R. bf. 44), are unsupported and
incorrect statements.
Respondents seem to be unable to appreciate the
position of the State Engineer, or of any of the users
on this supply, except themselves.
Another serious misconception which is repeated
in connection with this Point III also, is contained in
the statements to the effect that we may not be the only
ones injured, or the first ones injured, or that others,
whom we are saying may be injured, did not protest.
and are not here complaining.
We have adverted to this before, but we wish to
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point out that this has nothing to do with the Engineer's
difficulties of ad1ninistration. He has to administer this
sche1ne, or plan, in connection with the rights of everybody else who n1ay be interested in this water, or any
of it, either before it reaches the Lake, or at any ti1ne
thereafter. This should be plain without further ('0111Inent.
No Statutor,lJ Requirement that Application be Granted:
~-\.s we have atte1npted to point out in our main brief
(A. bf. 66), Respondents appear to contend that the
Eng~neer has no discretion except to grant their application with the condition attached that it shall be "subject to prior rights." Respondents now somewhat confirm
that position, but they approach it from a little different
angle. They quote (R. bf. 55) 100-3-8 that "It shall be
the duty of the State Engineer upon payment of the approval fee, to approve an application if," etc., and the
statute goes on to say "if" there is unappropriated
water, or the proposed use will not impair existing
rights, or interfere with more beneficial use, etc.
Then they follow with the statement that "It will
be seen that if certain facts exist, it is the duty of the
State Engineer to approve the application." This contention of Respondents is exactly contrary to the analysis
of the statutes by Justice Wolfe in the Moyle case. (See
176 P. 2d at 889). It is pointed out there that this statement would be correct as to applications for temporary
change, but not as to a permanent change, and, "If certain facts exist," it is the duty of the State Engineer to
grant a temporary change. But, as the opinion ·points
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out, as to applications for a permanent change, both the
"privilege" of the applicant and the duty of the Engineer depend upon "the element of judgment of the State
Engineer."
The analysis in this opinion is clearly sound and the
position of Respondents as to this kind of an application is unsound. It is true that 100-3-8, while applying
more directly to applications to appropriate, has been
made to apply to smne features of the application for a
change in nature of use. This is done by the use of this
language in 100-3-3 itself:
"No permanent change shall be n1ade except
on the approval of the application therefor by the
State Engineer * * *
"The procedure in the State Engineer's Office
and the rights and duties of the applicant with
respect to applications for permanent changes
* * * shall be the same as provided in this Title
for applications to appropriate water."
Thus the Legislature sought to save time by adopting the other section dealing with appropriations. But
the above-quoted language makes this section applicable
only as to the three things mentioned: ( 1) Procedure;
(2) Duties of the applicant with respect to applications;
and (3) "The rights * * * of the applicant with respect
to applications for permanent changes."
These do not appear to in any way limit the language first above disclosed as to the judgment and discretion of the State Engineer. The first two, ns to procedure and as to the duty to make the application in
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the 1uanner or fol'ln provided, clearly do not have any
such effect.
Nor does the third one as to the rights of the applicant, because as this court has at least three times decided, the applicant has no "right" to have this application granted. All that he n1ay get is a privilege. (See
170 P. 2d at 895, Column 1).
~-\.nd our contentions are not, as asserted by Respondents, contrary to our statutes, but appear to be
in entire harmony therewith, as well as with the decisions of this court and the law generally, as to the control by the Courts of Legislative policy or executive
discretion.
CONCLUSION
We have attempted to cover only some of the principal contentions of respondents, which, it appeared,
might affect questions material to the decision here.
We believe this and our former brief fully sustain
the three points relied upon, and as recited in the title
page of our first brief.
In other words, the authorities support the position
that, where lower users have rights dependent upon runoff from direct irrigation, the withholding for later
use is not permissible.
Also, as we have stated in the conclusion to our
first brief, the natural conditions here and the properties
and actions of water, when taken in connection. with the
record, establish that the "effect" of this application
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

50
would be a diversion affecting lower users, both as to
time and volume.
And, in any event, it is certain that on a matter
of this kind, which is, by statute, made discretionary
with the State Engineer, the Trial Court may not substitute its administrative judgment for that of the State
Engineer, and, particularly, that it may not do so without
furnishing any facts or suggested method as a guide to
that official.
It seems obvious that it must have been due to this
error on the part of the District Court, or to the more
glaring error that the release of water from Utah Lake
into the Jordan River in three years since 1924, caused
the reversal here.
We respectfully submit that the reversal by the
Court was not justified, and should be set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON, Attorney General
J. LAMBERT GIBSON, Deputy
Attorneys for the State Engineer
C. C. PARSONS, WM. M. McCREA,
A. D. MOFFAT, CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for Kennecott Copper Corp.
MULLINER, PRINCE and MULLINER,
Attorneys for the City and the other
Associated Canal Companies.
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